Thank you very much. It is good to see you here.

I think the last time I saw you we were in Bosnia together, and

you have done a great job, you really have.

I was saying to the chairman, it is ironic that a witness would

spend more time talking about Bosnia than this subject, because

Bosnia is easier to deal with now than the other subject. That is progress.

I want you to understand—and I am being a bit facetious, but

it is interesting that in a bizarre way, that what are in my view

part of Milosevic’s tactic and strategy relates to the success we are

having in Bosnia, but that is another question.

Let me speak to Bosnia for a second, then get to Kosovo.

You have personally, and the administration has generally, and

I have specifically been pushing in every way we could in Bosnia

to give nonnationalists of any stripe or denomination an equal

chance of footing and opportunity to participate in the social and

political and cultural life of a country still one entity, although it

is divided into the Republic of Srpska and the Federation.

I read with interest and some dismay—and I know this is not totally

your all,by any stretch of the imagination—RFERL May 6

broadcast today, ‘‘A spokesman for the OSCE, which is supervising

the September general elections, said in Syria that only the new

parliament will be able to change the rules for the election of the

three-member joint presidency, RFERL South Slavic Service reported.

‘‘Several NGO’s and representatives of nonnationalist parties

have suggested that the OSCE change the rules now so that each

of the three is elected at large, and not just by one ethnic constituency.

Recent polls suggest that such changes would sweep the current

three members of the presidency from office and replace them with nonnationalists.’’

Why is that not a good idea?

Well, that is a great answer, but a nonanswer.

I agree with everything you said, but——

I guess the question I have, Mr. Ambassador, I

do not expect you to answer it now, but maybe you can answer it

for the record, and that is, is there a legal impediment to having

at-large elections rather than the way they are now slated for the presidency?

There is, and I see your staff shaking his head there is.

Maybe your staff behind you, who seems to know

the answer, can before he leaves come up and tell me, and I am

not being facetious, because I am not sure. I do not know the answer

to the question. I should know it. I do not know the answer to the question.

But if there is any way, it would seem to me what an incredible

positive signal it would send if the polling data is correct, that the

body politic, including all—including Bosniaks, Croats, Serbs, all, a

majority believed that, and that is a question I do not know the answer

to. I am just reading you this one clip from the radio broadcast.

It seems to me that would be certainly very strong evidence that

your evidence are taking some root here if that was a consensus

view of the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina. I do not know that it

is. All I am reading you is this. So I would like to at some point

return to that. I mean, after the hearing, return to that issue with you all, if I may.

You also said that it is the administration’s position that we are

opposed to an independent Kosovo, yet you indicated that the idea

of everything being on the table, including independence—and I assume

that’s what it means—in upcoming negotiations, in any negotiations,

was basically a good thing. Is that correct?

We are about to hear from a very distinguished

former Congressperson, and a person who is at his present status

is a spokesperson for Albanians in the diaspora, Albanian-Americans

here, ostensibly others as well, and one of the things that I

am going to ask him is what I would like to ask you now.

There is a letter I received, and it asserts the following: The national

question, which calls for the liberation of occupied Albanian

lands, national identity, and self-determination. Now, that sounds

to me like a Greater Albania. If we start off with this as an assertion,

that these are occupied Albanian lands, I am not sure where

all this goes. Actually, I am fairly sure where it all goes.

But have you had much contact, or has the administration had

much contact with Albanians in Kosovo in terms of a sense of what their agenda is?

Now, obviously, I take no back seat to anyone in terms of my

speaking out and calling for the use of force against the atrocities

of Milosevic. I have said to his face and I say again I think he is

a war criminal. I have not the slightest bit of empathy, sympathy,

or any positive—I see no social redeeming value to the man, and

that is me, and I make no bones about it.

But—but, I think Kosovo is a very different circumstance than

Bosnia, very different circumstance, and so one of the things that

I would like to know is, what is your assessment of the size, the

capabilities, the resources, the organization of the UCK, and does

the administration view it as the legitimate political bargaining

unit, or does it view it as a terrorist organization, or what do you

think of its political leaders?

Do we have a formal position relative to—as opposed to—as opposed

to the Democratic League for Kosovo?

Is the UCK represented on that negotiating team?

To state the obvious, I mean, it is fairly transparent,

my concern here, and that is, is the good doctor able, does

he have the legitimacy——

To negotiate or is this Kosovo Liberation

Army, has that essentially usurped——

Well, I, speaking only for myself—the chairman

may have a different view. We have not discussed this. But as one

who you know probably was the most consistent voice the last 5

years for us to intervene in Bosnia, I want to say to anybody who

is listening if the UCK thinks that the move for independence is

likely to find support here in the Congress I think they are making

a tragic mistake, a tragic mistake.

I may be wrong, but I think that to reinforce the point you made,

that it seems like this is an unholy alliance to enhance the prospect

that we do not do anything, that they cannot gain a consensus here

in the Congress to support the administration efforts, because nobody

I know of is talking about the independence of Kosovo as a

separate entity, as part of a Greater Albania, and I just think

that—again, I speak only for myself, but I think there is going to

be a tragic strategic and tactical miscalculation to think that there would be any help.

The one thing that is likely to allow those who do not even want

to be involved anywhere in the Balkans to be able to say that this

is a civil war of independence, and you will find everybody walk

away here—I think. I could be dead wrong.

That is why everyone would walk away.

Woodrow Wilson is dead, and his idea was not so hot in the first place.

I just think—I really get a sinking sense, as this goes on, that

the more people like me and the chairman and you and the President

and others who speak up about the atrocities that are being

waged by Milosevic in Belgrade, the more we may be—and there

is no alternative but to speak out against that, so I am not suggesting

that be silenced.

But I think some people are reading the wrong message from

that, that that means that we believe that there should be an independent

State of Kosovo, or some changed statutes as it relates to

sovereignty within Yugoslavia, and it seems to—I just hope that

message is not one that—I think it would be a misreading of our

revulsion of Milosevic and his policies to conclude that those of us,

speaking again for me, that I think that means there should be an

independent State of Kosovo.

I do think autonomy—I do think the status, predisintegration of

the greater Yugoslavia, is important, and I do think we should participate

in providing a fora, or at least indirectly through the Contact

Group of bringing about a change in the behavior on the part

of Belgrade, but I again suggest the one thing that will probably

curtail any consensus on that effort would be if, in fact, the statement

that I read was viewed as the policy, a national question

which calls for the liberation of occupied Albanian lands, national

identity, and self-determination.

I do not have any further questions.

Thank you very much. Congressman, welcome.

Gentlemen, welcome again.

As Mr. Hooper and Mr. Fox remember, we have had discussions

before, and I do not disagree with anything you have said about democracy

in Belgrade is the ultimate requirement to have peace in

the Balkans, but it seems to me we have a little bit of a selective memory here.

My recollection of the Christmas warning, which I happened to

support, was that that warning was given at the very time when

the administration wanted to leave, the Bush administration refused

to do anything about the situation in Bosnia and

Herzegovina, and when they were supporting, when the Secretary

of State said there was nothing we can do, and when there was the

easiest call to make because the least was happening.

So I find this a little bit fascinating, the bashing that is going

on right now, but I happen to share your ultimate view, as long as

you all acknowledge that the previous administration created the

circumstance that allowed all of this to take place.

You all make it sound like there was this Bush administration

that came along and stood firm and was there, and while rape

camps were set up, while tens of thousands of people were being

massacred, while the proportions of the atrocities exceeded, not in

kind but in number, by fiftyfold what is going on here, and we

stood by and said, ah, do not move in Kosovo, but cross an international

border, take the whole JNA over there, go ahead and blow

everyone away over there—no problem. No warning, nothing. Remember that part?

You are looking at the one person who was the

most active up here, so I mildly resent——

I remember. I just wanted to set the stage here.

Cynical me thought it was done because it was

the only one they thought they were not going to have to exercise

any force on at the time, but that is just—I have been here too

long. I am mildly cynical, based on everything else that was not done.

I always thought you were a Democrat.

I do not want to refight that political war, but

I want to sort of set the stage here a little bit for about how, not

the atrocities that are occurring, but the circumstances are different.

It does not necessarily bring about a result different from what

you all are suggesting, but I want to make sure that we know what

we are talking about here, OK, or that I know what I am talking

about. You all know what you are talking about. I want to make

sure that I know what I am talking about and that I know what

you are talking about.

Now, this notion that the only solution now is to do something

we are having trouble even maintaining doing now, I do not know

if you remember, guys, we could not get anybody to do anything,

including half the Democrats, on Bosnia. Remember that part?

Have you got that part? Remember? And we are hanging on by our

fingernails in terms of support for the maintenance of U.S. forces.

There is a resolution introduced today by Senator Hutchison and

Senator Byrd demanding and requiring—not a resolution, a piece

of legislation. I have not seen it. I was just told about it by my

staff—saying that American forces had to be drawn down to no

more than 2,500 by the year 2001, or 2000.

I mean, we are still fighting like hell just to keep—I mean, I am

on the floor or in the caucus or in a Senator’s office literally every

week pleading the case, shuttling basically back to Bosnia to make

the case, progress is being made, so the context in which this is all

taking place now is not different—well, it is different, but it is a

totally changed circumstance.

Now, here is what the proposals are. You are suggesting—the

suggestion is that the only reason NATO is not moving, or we are

not moving on NATO, is because of Russia. Well, the Italians and

the Greeks own a telecommunications system there. You guys

know this. I do not know why you do not say it. The French are

the French—you understand that part better than I do—and the

Germans are reluctant to move, ever, as it relates to anything having

to do with Serbia.

So we talk about all we have got to do is say, by the way, NATO,

we are going and they will follow. Well, you may be right. You may

be right, but I am not so sure that is right, number 1.

Number 2, with regard to blaming the victims, I am not blaming

the victims. What I am trying to get straight here is what this negotiation

is supposed to be about and what we are demanding of Milosevic.

It is real important, it seems to me, when we make a demand

we know what it is, and what is the demand? The demand first

and foremost is, is stop the atrocities. Nobody disagrees with that.

The second demand is, at a minimum, at a minimum allow some

autonomy, at a minimum. But at a maximum, what are we asking

for? What should we impose? I mean, you have both said that this

notion of negotiation and repeating the Contact Group involvement,

all of those is just replaying all the wasted years in Bosnia before

we finally got to a point where at least the atrocities have stopped,

if not ratification of the cleansing having occurred.

But what is it—you had a chance, as I have in the past, and will

probably never get it again in the light of my attitude toward the

man, but what do you say to Milosevic? What is the bottom line

we demand? Big nations cannot bluff. What is the bottom line?

I asked Mr. Hooper and Mr. Fox. I know what the bottom line

is, but I will ask you as well, Congressman, because—anyway, I will ask you.

You and I both know Belgrade well, and I am

being presumptuous in suggesting I know it well as well. We both know it well.

I have been searching for that democratic middle in Serbia for

a whole hell of a long time. Do you want to give me any names?

Do you want to give me any ideas? You talk about who to support.

I have made visits. I have met with all of the dissidents.

One of the most destabilizing—how can I say it? That is the

wrong word—most disappointing things was, I found that at least

half the opposition was more rabid nationalist than our boy

Milosevic was, so do you want to tell me—I mean, I am looking

here. I am all for it. Find me—show me—identify me—I will go

visit, literally—not figuratively, literally.

I met with 120 dissidents, quote-unquote, opponents to Milosevic,

went in a room with 60 or so in one room. I started talking. They

looked at me like, no, no, no, you got this all wrong. We are more

Serbian than Milosevic. They were literally, literally, literally critical

of Milosevic for being too accommodating.

So I am desperately seeking Susan, OK, desperately looking. The

State Department is desperately looking. The West is desperately

looking. Have you got any ideas for me?

Forget them. I am looking now. Who do you have in mind?

Well, again, I am taking too much of the chairman’s

time here, and I know we have got to go, but I would really

like to meet with each of you together or individually to pursue

this, because it has been something I have been trying to seek in

earnest here, and it is a very—as you well know, if it is to be

found, if it exists, the likelihood of it being developed as a reasonable

alternative—and I was just pointing out that one of the two

people you named boycotted the election, the last election, and he

lost all of his influence when he did it, but it may change.

But the bottom line is this. It is worth the effort. We should be

pursuing it. I fully agree with you. I just think time—you just said

the fuse is short. I see no ability to generate and produce that kind

of indigenous democratic initiative that coincides with the timeframe

that is left on the fuse.

A last question I will ask, and this idea of engaging NATO and

getting NATO involved, I think I have no hesitancy, and have had

none for 6 years now, of suggesting the United States unilaterally

suggest and promise and deliver on the use of force. That is not

anything I have any trouble with.

Here is the problem I have, the idea of thinking that you are

going to be able to negotiate, even with that kind of commitment

on the part of the United States, a NATO force that is going to circle—

the phrase used by two of you, I believe the Congressman—

well, maybe it is the Congressman. I am not sure—that to circle

Serbia, that means we are going to place NATO troops in Albania,

Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania—lots of luck, seeing that happen.

I think we have a moral obligation to have some consonance between

what we suggest and the possibility of it ever happening,

and you may get NATO to conclude that it is worth sending an observer

force in. You may get NATO—I think that is a stretch. You

may get NATO to be able to do a number of things, but to get that

to happen I think is not a sound,

Were I in the State Department and you were present, I suggested

that to you, you would say, Joe, go back and get me another

solution. You know it, I know it, we all know it, and I do not think

it is responsible for us to suggest that as something that we can

or is likely to happen.

So here is my question, and this is to you, Congressman. Is, in

terms of where you think—if you have to pick a horse here, do you

suggest that we, the United States, use all our influence and whatever

force we are wiling to use to deal with and promote and support

the Democratic League of Kosovo, or the Kosovo Liberation

Army, because right now they are not in tandem.

Because we have to look at reality.

What action? Are we going to use physical force?

Well, no, it is different—well, it is not different.

I just want to know what you suggest, because back then, when I

was in your position, I was suggesting we bomb Belgrade. I was

suggesting that we send American pilots in and blow up all of the

bridges on the Drina. I was suggesting we take out his oil supplies.

I was suggesting very specific action.

And isn’t it interesting that about 200,000 people

were killed in the meantime by the time they did.

That is why I want to know what you are suggesting now.

Because the French let him walk around. That is why.

I agree with you. I think there is a number of

things we can do. I think some of them, the things suggested here

today are totally unrealistic of what we are likely to do, but I think

there are a number of things we can do, and starting with the

Christmas warning.

I also think you have all helped to make the case. You say, let

us get NATO in. What do you think is going to happen in the little

vote to put NATO troops in Albania when Greece and Turkey vote?

What do you think, huh?

I want to be there at that meeting when you guys and your diplomatic

skills bring the Greeks and the Turks together on a uniform vote.

We do have this little thing, in this little outfit called NATO

called consensus. You do not get them all, you do not get any of

them, you know. That is kind of the NATO thing.

There was less of an interest that they each had

there than there is ‘‘inside Serbia.’’